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DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS
THE DOCTRINE OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
By Oliver P. Field*
THIS study will not be concerned with the effect of party
platforms upon judicial decisions. The term "political ques-
tion" as used in the following pages will refer to its more tech-
nical meaning in the field of constitutional law. It is elementary
that the courts will not decide political questions. The reason us-
ually given for this attitude of the courts is that the decision of the
question has been placed with the executive or legislative
branches of the government. These departments are often called
the political departments when contrasted with the judicial de-
partment.1 When the court is confronted with a case involving
a political question it will look to the political branches of the
government to learn what the view is which those departments
have expressed. When that view is ascertained, the courts will
act in conformity with it. The result is that the case is not
decided upon its merits as an independent question by the
court. The expressed view of the political department becomes
a rule of decision for the court.
There is a distinction to be drawn between the doctrine of
political questions and the doctrine which underlies those cases
which concern the difference between ministerial and discretion-
ary acts. For that reason the cases dealing with ministerial and
discretionary duties of public officers will be omitted in this
study, though they are often included in the general discussions
of political questions. In the following sections an attempt is
made to classify the cases which the federal courts have held to
involve political questions. The classification is made on the
basis of the subject matter involved in the cases. In conclusion,
such generalizations as seem warranted by the cases will be
formulated. Such utility as the study may have will consist,
however, in the classification of the cases, because conclusions
*Shevlin Fellow in Science, Literature, and the Arts, University of
Minnesota.
'See Willoughby, Constitutional Law, chap. 51. It is believed that
the doctrine of political questions as applied in the state courts has been
influenced by additional factors to those which enter into the cases in the
federal courts. For that reason the state cases have not been treated in
this paper.
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and explanations are often colored to some extent by the view-
point of the student.
1. NEGOTIATIONS, VIOLATION, AND TERMINATION OF TREATIES
The federal courts will not inquire into the constitutional
powers of the representatives of foreign nations with whom
the United States negotiates treaties.2 In Doe v. Braden ob-
jection was made that the King of Spain did not have the con-
stitutional power under Spanish law to annul certain grants
of land made by him to Spaniards within the territory of Florida
at the time negotiations for the purchase of the territory were
under way between the United States and Spain. The court
refused to consider this objection, holding that it was for the
president and the senate of the United States to determine
whether the powers of the King were satisfactory in this in-
stance. The court felt that it was concluded on the question
in view of the fact that those departments were satisfied with
the King's powers. The fact that the political departments might
have been mistaken was said not to alter the case. Chief Justice
Taney stated the reason for the decision in the following quota-
tion:
"It would be impossible for the executive department of the
government to conduct our foreign relations with any advantage
to the country, and fulfill the duties which the constitution has
imposed upon it, if every court in the country was authorized
to inquire and decide whether the person who ratified the treaty
on behalf of a foreign nation had the power, by its constitution
and laws, to make the engagement into which he entered."
This doctrine is also applicable to treaties concluded with the
Indian tribes.3 In one case it was held that the courts could
not go behind the treaty to see whether the head men acting in
behalf of a tribe actually represented all the divisions of the
tribe.4
Whether a treaty has been broken by one of the parties to it
has been held to be a matter which the courts will not determine.
justice Iredell said in Ware v. Hylton,5 "These are consider-
ations of policy, considerations of extreme magnitude, and cer-
tainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of a
court of justice." One of the leading cases involving this
2(1853) 16 How. (U.S.) 635, 14 L. Ed. 1090.
3Fellows v. Blacksmith, (1865) 19 How. (U.S.) 366, 15 L. Ed. 684.41n re Race Horse, (1895) 70 Fed. 598, 607; Ansley v. Ainsworth,
(1902) 4 Ind. T. 308, 69 S.W. 884 (refusing to countenance the argument
that the Atoka agreement was procured under duress).
5(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 260, 1 L. Ed. 568.
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point is that of Taylor v. Morton,6 wherein it was alleged that
the United States was discriminating against Russian hemp con-
trary to a treaty with Russia. Justice Curtis said in his opinion
in that case:
"Is it a judicial question whether a treaty with a foreign
sovereignty has been violated by him . . . ? I apprehend not.
These powers have not been confided by the people to the judici-
ary, which has no suitable means to exercise them; but to the
executive and the legislative departments of our government.
They belong to diplomacy and legislation, not to the administra-
tion of existing laws."
This view has been expressed in other cases.7  It was alleged
that the first Chinese exclusion legislation constituted a breach
of the Burlingame treaty of 1868.8 The court answered that
if there had been a breach of that treaty by the United States
the courts were not the proper place in which to make com-
plaint. 9  Whether China had just cause for complaint was
said to be a matter to be taken up with the political departments.
The courts were said to have no other choice than to regard the
case as any ordinary conflict of a congressional statute with a
treaty. Justice Miller said in the Head Money Case,'° that if
the honor and interests of a nation did not suffice to secure the
enforcement and observance of a treaty, resort must be had to
other means. The infraction of a treaty was said to be a sub-
ject for international negotiation, or even war. To quote from
his opinion: "It is obvious that with all this the judicial courts
have nothing to do and can give no redress."
The protection of Mexican property rights in land located
within the territory ceded by Mexico to the United States by
the treaty of Guadeloupe Hidalgo was held to be exclusively a
congressional function." The court refused to enforce the
provisions of the treaty when the government of the United
6(1885) 2 Curt. (U.S.C.C.) 454, Fed. Cas. No. 13,799, affirmed in
(1862) Black (U.S.) 481, 17 L. Ed. 277.
7The Cherokee Tobacco, (1870) 11 Wall. (U.S.) 616, 20 L. Ed. 227.
sIt is of course well settled that in case of clear conflict between a
treaty and an act of congress, subsequently enacted, the statute will prevail.
See Head Money Cases, (1884) 112 U. S. 580, 28 L. Ed. 798, 5 S.C.R. 247;
Whitney v. Robertson, (1887) 124 U. S. 190, 31 L. Ed. 386, 8 S.C.R. 456;
The Cherokee Tobacco, (1870) 11 Wall. 616, 20 L. Ed. 227; Hijo v. United
States, (1904) 194 U. S. 315, 48 L. Ed. 994, 24 S.C.R. 727.9Chinese Exclusion Case, (1889) 130 U.S. 581, 32 L. Ed. 1068, 9
S.C.R. 623. See also In re Ah Lung, (1883) 9 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.) 305,
18 Fed. 28.
10(1884) 112 U.S. 580, 28 L. Ed. 798, 5 S.C.R. 247. See also The
Clinton Bridge, (1867) 1 Woolw. (U.S.C.C.) 150, Fed. Cas. No. 2900.
"Botiller v. Dominguez, (1888) 130 U.S. 238, 32 L. Ed. 926, 9
S.C.R. 528.
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States chooses to disregard them. Although the court conceded
that the rights in question were perfect at international law, it
was nevertheless said that:
"The duty of protecting imperfect rights of property under
treaties such as those by which territory was ceded by Mexico
to the United States . . . rests upon the political and not the
judicial department."1
Closely related to the subject of the violation of treaties is
that of the termination of treaties. The courts have held that
they will follow the decision of the political branches of the
government in determining whether a treaty has been terminated.
In these cases it is the executive department to which the court
looks for guidance. In Ware v. Hylton Justice Iredell expressed
the opinion that the treaty between England and the United
States must be regarded as still existing by the courts unless
it were shown that the other branches of the government looked
upon it as terminated.13 It is interesting to note that Justice
Iredell based his opinion upon the law of nations rather than
upon constitutional grounds. Incidentally he also expressed the
opinion that only Congress could terminate a treaty.' 4
A number of cases have arisen in which the question was
presented to the court of the effect upon a treaty of the incorpo-
ration of a nation with whom the United States had concluded
a treaty into an empire or larger nation. The courts have looked
to the executive department for their cue in these cases. In ac-
cordance with this doctrine a consular convention with Algiers
was held to be terminated by the incorporation of that country
into the dominions of the French Republic.' 5 With the for-
mation of the German Empire questions were raised as to the
binding effect of extradition treaties' previously concluded with
Bavaria' 6  and Prussia.'" In each of these cases the
"2United States v. Santa Fe, (1896) 165 U.S. 675, 41 L. Ed. 874, 17
S.C.R. 472. See also United States v. Sandoval, (1897) 167 U.S. 278, 42
L. Ed. 168, 17 S.C.R. 868, wherein it was said: "The mode in which private
rights of property may be secured, and the obligations imposed upon the
United States by treaties fulfilled, belongs to the political department of
the government to provide."
13(1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 261, 1 L. Ed. 568.
14See Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations 107. "The only
constitutional authorities for terminating treaties are Congress by an act
signed by the president or passed over his veto, the treaty-making power
and possibly the president alone." This author speaks of the power to
terminate treaties as a legislative power.
'
5 Mahoney v. United States, (1869) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 62, 19 L. Ed. 864.
16In re Thomas, (1874) 12 Blatch. (U.S.C.C.) 370, Fed. Cas. No.
13887.
17Terlinden v. Ames, (1901) 184 U.S. 270, 46 L. Ed. 534, 22 S.C.R. 484.
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executive regarded the treaties as existing and the courts adhered
to the views expressed by that department. The famous Charlton
Case'8 involved a breach of an extradition treaty by Italy.
In spite of the fact that Italy had breached the treaty the Supreme
Court held that the treaty must be applied in so far as it affected
the duties of the United States. The reason given for this de-
cision by the court was that the executive department had pro-
nounced the treaty a binding obligation upon the United States.
The person to be extradited in this case was an American
citizen.
It thus appears the existence or non-existence of a treaty as
a binding obligation upon the United States is a political question.
The court has, however, decided whether a given treaty has been
suspended by a state of war.19 But the cases in which this has
been done have been those in which there had been no action by
the political departments of the government on the subject.20
Should the political departments have taken any affirmative action
in the matter there can be no doubt that the courts would abide
by their action.
There is only one method by which the courts could terminate
treaties. That would be by declaring a treaty unconstitutional,
which apparently has never been done. 21  There are some dicta
to the effect that if there was a clear conflict between the treaty
and the constitution, the courts would be constrained to declare
the treaty null and void. This is of course a logical result of the
doctrine of constitutional limitations which is so firmly embedded
in our system of government, but the opportunities to distinguish
and explain and interpret are so varied that the courts will per-
'sCharlton v. Kelly, (1913) 229 U.S. 447, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 33 S.C.R. 945,
affirming 185 Fed. 880. Justice Lurton said, ".... on the question whether
this treaty has ever been terminated, governmental action in respect to it is
of controlling importance." See also Castro De Uriarte, (1883) 16 Fed. 93.
'9Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New
Haven, (1823) 8 Wheat. (U.S.) 464, 5 L. Ed. 662.
20Wright, op. cit., p. 256.
21In re Dillon, (1854) 7 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.) 561, Fed. Cas. No. 3914
does not decide that the treaty involved in that case was unconstitutional.
See note, Mathews, Conduct of American Foreign Relations 191. The case
of Thomas v. Gay, (1898) 169 U.S. 264, 42 L. Ed. 740, 18 S.C.R. 340, is
cited to support the following statement, "The Supreme Court has decided
that a treaty cannot alter the constitution," by Noel Sargent in an article
entitled "Bills for Raising Revenue under the Federal and State Consti-
tutions," 4 MINNESOTA LAw REviEW 330, 343, note 43. This is clearly error,
for the case decided did not involve the question, nor was it decided upon that
ground, and the portion quoted in the opinion from the decision in Foster
v. Neilson, (1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415, is itself dictum.
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haps be loath to see a "clear conflict." Doubtless most courts
would agree with Justice Chase when he said :22
"If the court possess a power to declare treaties void, I shall
never exercise it, but in a very clear case indeed."
2. BEGINNING AND ENDING OF WAR
The date at which a war begins is a political question. When
a formal declaration of war accompanies the outbreak of war
there should be little difficulty. But in the case of the Civil War
no formal declaration of war was issued, and the question be-
came quite important. The Civil War did not begin in all of
the states at the same time. The courts accepted the dates fixed
by the political departments in those cases which involved the
date of the beginning of the war.2 2  There is no reason to
doubt that the courts would adopt the same attitude towards
the question of the date of the beginning of a foreign war. It
would logically follow from the principle just stated that the
courts would also look to the political branches of the govern-
ment to ascertain whether a state of war exists. It was said in
one case that :24
"The condition of peace or war, public or civil, in a legal
sense, must be determined by the political department, not the
judicial. The latter is bound by the decision thus made."
The date of the termination of a war is also to be fixed by
the political departments. In the case of the Civil War there was
the same difficulty in fixing the date of its termination that exist-
ed in setting the date of its beginning. The court resorted to
executive and congressional acts for evidence on the question of
when the war terminated..
2 5
22Ware v. Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (U.S.) 199, 237, 1 L. Ed. 568.23The Protector, (1871) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 20 L. Ed. 463. In this
case it was suggested that the proclamation of April 19, 1861, be taken to
mark the beginning of the war in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Flor-
ida, Mississippi, Texas, and Louisiana. For Virginia and North Carolina
the proclamation of April 17 was accepted. See also Hamilton v. Dillin,
(1874) 21 Wall. (U.S.) 73, 22 L. Ed. 528.24United States v. One Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, (1862)
Fed. Cas. No. 15941. Also In re Wulzen, (1916) 235 Fed. 362; United
States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., (1920) 264 Fed. 691; United States v.
Tropic Wind, (1861) 2 Hayw. & H. (C.C.D.C.) 374, Fed. Cas. No. 16,541a.
Hamilton v. McClaughry, (1905) 136 Fed. 445, is not contra, though at
first glance it might seem to be so.25The following cases deal with the termination of the Civil War.
Brown v. Hiatts, (1872) 15 Wall. (U.S.) 177, 183, 21 L. Ed. 128; Williams
v. Bruffy, (1877) 96 U.S. 176, 193, 24 L. Ed. 654; Adger v. Alston, (1872)
15 Wall. (U.S.) 555, 560, 21 L. Ed. 234; Batesville v. Kauffman, (1873)
18 Wall. (U.S.) 151, 155, 21 L. Ed. 775; Ross v. Jones, (1874) 22 Wall.
(U.S.) 576, 587, 22 L. Ed. 730; Raymond v. Thomas, (1875) 91 (U.S.) 712,
714, 23 L. Ed. 434; Lamar v. Brown, (1875) 92 U.S. 187, 193, 23 L. Ed.
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A somewhat unusual situation existed in the termination of
the World War, so far as the United States was concerned.
Hostilities ended with the signing of the Armistice on November
11, 1918. But the United States did not ratify the treaty of
peace at the time when many of the other belligerent nations did
so. It had been intimated in some cases that the proper method
of ending a foreign war was by a treaty of peace.20  No treaty
of peace was signed by the United States during the three years
following the signing of the Armistice. During this period the
courts were besieged with cases which turned on the question of
when the war ended. 2  One of the inferior federal courts
apparently succumbed to the pressure and grasped at a statement
made by the president in a speech to congress to the effect that
with the cessation of hostilities "the war thus comes to an end."
This was held to be evidence that the executive regarded the war
as terminated. 2 But the Supreme Court held that the war did
not come to an end with the signing of the Armistice,2 9 and
several other inferior courts held likewise in cases coming before
them. It was finally decided that the joint resolution of July 2,
1921, marked the end of the war in a legal sense,2 0 and it was
thus made manifest that there are other ways of terminating a
war so far as the domestic courts are concerned than that of the
ratification of a treaty of peace.
650; Carrol v. Greene, (1875) 92 U.S. 509, 23 L. Ed. 738; Gooding v. Varn,
(1869) Chase (U.S.C.C.) 286, Fed. Cas. No. 5,539; Realy v. Mothershed,
(1875) 11 Fed. Cas. No. 6,296; Walker v. Beauchler, (1876) 27 Gratt.
(Va.) 511, 524; Isaacs v. Richmond, (1893) 90 Va. 30, 38, 17 S.E. 760;
Simmons v. Trumbo, (1876) 9 W.Va. 358, 364. Perhaps the two leading
cases are United States v. Anderson, (1869) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 56, 19 L. Ed.
615, and The Protector, (1871) 12 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 20 L. Ed. 463.26Unjted States v. Anderson, (1869) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 56, 19 L. Ed. 615,
where it was said, "In a foreign war, a treaty of peace would be the evi-
dence of the time when it closed." Also Hijo v. United States, (1904) 194
U.S. 315, 48 L. Ed. 994, 24 S.C.R. 727.27See Nueces Valley Town-Site Co. v. McAdoo, (1919) 257 Fed. 143;
United States v. Steene, (1920) 263 Fed. 130; Weed v. Lockwood, (1920)
266 Fed. 785; United States v. Russel, (1920) 265 Fed. 414; Weisman
v. United States, (1921) 271 Fed. 944; Vincenti v. United States, (1921)
272 Fed. 114; Ex parte Sichofsky, (1921) 273 Fed. 694; Bentall v. United
States, (1921) 276 Fed. 121; United States v. Wall, (1921) 278 Fed. 838;
Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, (1922) 281 Fed. 804.
2sUnited States v. Hicks, (1919) 256 Fed. 707.
29Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., (1919) 251 U.S. 146, 64 L. Ed.
194, 40 S.C.R. 106; Kahn v. Anderson, (1920) 255 U.S. 1, 65 L. Ed. 475,
41 S.C.R. 224. See also state cases following these cases, Waldes v. Basch,(1919) 109 Misc. 306, 179 N.Y.S. 713; K-neeland-Bigelow Co. v. Mich.
Cent. Ry. Co., (1919) 207 Mich. 546, 174 N.W. 605.
3OMiller v. Rouse, (1921) 276 Fed. 715.
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3. ADMISSION AND DEPORTATION OF ALIENS
The power of a nation to control the admission of aliens has
been said to be a power which inheres in sovereignty.3 ' The
right to determine what persons a nation wishes to admit and
what persons it wishes to exclude finds its source in the law
of nations.1 - The courts have held that the national government
in the United States has this power. In the Chinese Exclusion
Case33 the court said:
"The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
sovereignty belonging to the government of the United States,
as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the constitution,
the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one."
The power to expel aliens is said to rest on the same ground as
the power to exclude,"4 and Congress may expel such aliens
as seem to it to be undesirable. 5 It is Congress that has the
power to control the admission and exclusion of aliens. 38 This
is not an express power of Congress, but one implied from several
expressed powers.3 7  More often, however, the court has de-
duced the power from the theory of inherent sovereignty re-
siding in the national government for purposes of international
relations.
38
312 C.J. 1075, sec. 46; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens
Abroad 45; 1 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Applied by the United
States 94, "A state is acknowledged to enjoy the broadest right to regulate
the admission of aliens to its territory."
3-"According to the accepted maxims of international law, every sov-
ereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty and essential to
self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such manner and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe." 2 C.J. 1075.
33(1888) 130 U.S. 581, 608, 32 L. Ed. 1068, 9 S.C.R. 623.3 4Borchard, op. cit., p. 48; 2 C. J. 1075; 1 Willoughby, op. cit., p. 253;
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1892) 149 U. S. 698, 37 L. Ed. 905, 13
S.C.R. 1016.35 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1892) 149 U.S. 698, 37 L. Ed.
905, 13 S.C.R. 1016; United States v. Rodgers, (1911) 191 Fed. 970; Ekiu
v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 35 L. Ed. 1146, 12 S.C.R. 336.
36Zakonite v. Wolf, (1912) 226 U.S. 272, 57 L. Ed. 218, 33 S.C.R. 31;
Ex parte Li Dick, (1910) 176 Fed. 998, 999; Bugaiewitz v. Adams, (1913)
228 U.S. 585, 57 L. Ed. 978, 33 S.C.R. 607, where Justice Holmes said: "It
is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation
of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful." See also Jap-
anese Immigrant Case, (1903) 189 U.S. 86, 47 L. Ed. 721, 23 S.C.R. 611.3 7This type of power is sometimes denominated a resulting power, as
distinguished from the usual implied power where the implication rests on
a single express power. See Willoughby, op. cit., secs. 37, 38; 2 Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution, 5th Ed., sec. 1256.3 8Fong Yue Ting v. United States, (1892) 149 U.S. 698, 37 L. Ed.
905, 13 S.C.R. 1016; Rodgers v. United States, (1908) 157 Fed. 381. The
power over foreign commerce has sometimes been invoked. See United
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It was said in the Chinese Exclusion Case that the determin-
ation of the government on the question of the admission of
aliens was "necessarily conclusive upon all its departments and
officers." The term government as here used doubtless refers
to Congress. Explicit statements are to be found in several
subsequent cases to the effect that the admission and expulsion
of aliens rests with the political departments. Justice Gray
stated in Ekiu v. United States :39
"It belongs to the political department of the government
• . . It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any
domicil or residence within the United States, nor even been
admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to
enter it, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures
of the legislative and executive branches of the national govern-
ment."
It was observed in the Japanese Immigrant Case :40 "Now, it
has long been settled that the power to exclude or expel aliens
belonged to the political department of the government." To
quote a still more positive statement from Rodgers v. United
States :41
"This absolute and plenary power is recognized by interna-
tional law, as essential to national well being and self preserva-
tion. The power is political in its nature, and its exercise is
not subject to judicial challenge or criticism."
The courts will not decide on the wisdom of any particular policy
adopted by Congress in the control of aliens.
But it is not to be understood that Congress is therefore
free to break down the protection of constitutional guaranties to
the individual in carrying out its policies with regard to aliens.
It is true that a deportation proceeding is not a criminal proceed-
ing, and therefore does not require a jury trial.42  The courts
go far in upholding the determinations of administrative officers, 43
States v. Williams, (1904) 194 U.S. 279, 48 L. Ed. 979, 24 S.C.R. 719;
United States v. Craig, (1886) 28 Fed. 795; Black, Constitutional Law 393;
Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution 214, citing Oceanic Navi-
gation Company v. Stranahan, (1909) 214 U.S. 320, 53 L. Ed. 1013, 29
S.C.R. 671.
39(1891) 142 U.S. 651, 660, 35 L. Ed. 1146, 12 S.C.R. 336.40(1903) 189 U.S. 86, 100, 47 L. Ed. 721, 23 S.C.R. 611.
41(1908) 157 Fed. 381, 383.
422 C.J. 1098, sec. 100; Zakonite v. Wolf, (1912) 226 U.S. 272; 57
L. Ed. 218, 33 S.C.R. 31; Bugajewitz v. Adams, (1913) 228 U.S. 585,
57 L. Ed. 978, 33 S.C.R. 607.43Japanese Immigrant Case, (1903) 189 U.S. 86, 47 L. Ed. 721, 23
S.C.R. 611; Pearson v. Williams, (1906) 202 U.S. 281, 50 L. Ed. 1029,
26 S.C.R. 608; United States v. Coe, (1905) 196 U.S. 635, 49 L. Ed. 629,
25 S.C.R. 794; Ah Sou v. United States, (1905) 200 U.S. 611, 50 L. Ed. 619,
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but even aliens are entitled to such protection as is afforded
in administrative proceedings by the due process clause.44
Evidence gained in contravention of the searches and seizures
clause of the federal constitution will not be admitted in a
deportation proceeding.45  Neither may Congress provide for
punishing entrance into the United States contrary to statute as
an infamous crime, without allowing a jury trial to determine
the guilt of the accused.46 It is also settled that a person who
is a citizen of the United States may not be deported as an
alien, though he be a descendant of a father who could not become
a naturalized citizen under the naturalization laws.4 7  Here
we find the fourteenth amendment a stumbling block to the
national government instead of to the states. In Keller v. United
States48 it was decided that Congress could not control the
relations of citizens with aliens for a period of three years after
the admission of the alien into the country. Such congressional
regulation was held to invade the police power of the states too
far. It is perhaps this view that Congress may not transgress
the constitution in the exercise of the power to control the ad-
mission and deportation of aliens that prompted the court to
suggest in some of its statements a caution that the courts could
intervene if required to do so by the constitution. The methods
used in deportation are subject to judicial review.4 9
4. JURISDICTION OVER TERRITORY
In a consideration of the cases dealing with the assertion of
jurisdiction over. territory a distinction must be drawn between
those cases which involve an assertion of jurisdiction over a
territory by the government of the United States against another
26 S.C.R. 753, 205 U.S. 407; United States v. Ju Toy, (1905) 198 U.S.
253, 49 L. Ed. 1040, 25 S.C.R. 644.
44Burdick, op. cit., p. 514.
45United States v. Wong Quong Wong, (1899) 94 Fed. 832.
46Wong Wing v. United States, (1896) 163 U.S. 228, 41 L. Ed. 140, 16
S.C.R. 977. Justice Shiras said: "But when Congress sees fit to further
promote such a policy by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous
punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, we think such
legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt
of the accused." 163 U.S. 237.
47United States v. Wong Kim Ark, (1896) 169 U.S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890,
18 S.C.R. 456; United States v. Ching Hing, (1915) 225 Fed. 794.
48(1909) 213 U.S. 138, 53 L. Ed. 737, 29 S.C.R. 470.49Some of the statements made by Justice Gray in United States v.
Rodgers, (1911) 191 Fed. 970, and Rodgers v. United States, (1907) 157
Fed. 381, seem to go pretty far in the direction of judicial abstention from
interference in matters touching deportation, going even to the length that
individual rights as guaranteed by the constitution should not stand in the
way of congressional policy with regard to the control of immigration.
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nation, and those cases which involve conflicting claims to terri-
tory between foreign nations. One is really a question of rec-
ognition, but because the subject matter of both is the same the
two will be treated together.
Whenever the political departments of the government assert
title to or jurisdiction over territory the courts must acquiesce in
that assertion. This was settled in Foster v. Neilsont5 wherein
a boundary dispute between the United States and France was
pressed upon the court for solution. The United States had con-
tended that Louisiana Territory extended as far eastward as the
Perdido river. France contended that the river Iberville was
the eastern boundary of Louisiana. While there was ground for
a difference of opinion, it was nevertheless decided that the court
could not enter into the merits of the controversy thus raised
in a land grant case. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that it
was not the function of the judiciary to press the interests of the
United States against a foreign power. The court felt itself
bound to follow the expressed view of Congress in the location
of the boundary line in question. The basis for this attitude
is set forth in -the following portion of the opinion :-1
"After these acts of sovereign power over the territory in dis-
pute, asserting the American construction of the treaty by which
the government claims it, to maintain the opposite construction
in its own courts would certainly be an anomaly in the history
and practice of nations. If those departments which are en-
trusted with the foreign intercourse of the nations, which assert
and maintain its interests against foreign powers, have unequiv-
ocally asserted its rights of dominion over a country of which
it is in possession, and which it claims under a treaty; if the legis-
lature has acted on the construction thus asserted; it is not in
its own courts that this construction is to be denied. A question
like this respecting the boundaries of nations, is, as has been
truly said, more a political than a legal question; and in its dis-
cussion the courts of every country must respect the pronounced
will of the legislature."
This is all that the case is authority for, in view of later decisions
of the court upon the other points involved.52
This principle of Foster v. Neilson is applicable to the case
of a disputed boundary between Indian lands and other terri-
tory. 3 Whether San Juan island belonged to the United
50(1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415.
-1(1829) 2 Pet. (U.S.) 253, 309, 7 L. Ed. 415.
52See United States v. Percheman, (1833) 7 Pet. (U.S.) 51, 8 L. Ed.
604, and particularly Garcia v. Lee, (1838) 12 Pet. (U.S.) 511, 9 L. Ed. 1176.
53Lattimer v. Poteet, (1840) 14 Pet. (U.S.) 4, 10 L. Ed. 328.
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States or to Great Britain was held to be a political question in
a territorial court.54 Speaking of the disputed boundaries of a
judicial district which was alleged to include the island in ques-
tion, the court said:
"Those bounds are identical, in the eye of the courts of the
United States with the boundary lines along the canal de Haro,
claimed by the political department of the general government to
be the true political boundary."
It was argued in Wilson v. Shaw" that the executive branch
had exceeded its powers in the acquisition of the territory from
Panama through which the canal was to be built. Congress had
established a government for the territory and in various other
ways given evidence that they ratified the action of the executive.
The court ruled that they were bound by this action, saying,
"Their concurrent action is conclusive upon the courts. We
have no supervisory control over the political branch of the
government in its action within the limits of the constitution."
One might speculate whether it would have made any difference
what sort of evidence had been adduced to show that the executive
had used reprehensible methods in the acquisition of the territory
in question.
In Jones v. United States"6 the jurisdiction of the United
States over an island, alleged to have been acquired by virtue of
the act of 1856 was challenged. The court said:
"'Who is the soverign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is
not a judicial but a political question, the determination of which
by the legislative and executive departments of any government
conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citi-
zens, and subjects of that government."
The date at which a territory comes under the jurisdiction of the
United States is a political question.5 7  Not only the extent of
the territory acquired, but the time of the acquisition of the same
is for the executive or the legislature to determine.5"
The states also follow the rule of Foster v. Neilson and
Jones v. United States with regard to the assertion of territorial
jurisdiction by the legislative and executive branches of the state
government. State courts have held that they will not examine
into the question of the territorial extent of the state.5 9  When
54Watts v. United States, (1870) 1 Wash. Terr. 288.
55(1907) 204 U. S. 24, 51 L. Ed. 351, 27 S.C.R. 233.56(1890) 137 U.S. 202, 34 L. Ed. 691, 11 S.C.R. 80.57United States v. Pico, (1859) 23 How. (U.S.) 321, 16 L. Ed. 464.5sSee also United States v. Yorba, (1863) 1 Wall. (U.S.) 412, 17
L. Ed. 635.
59State v. Wagner, (1873) 61 Me. 178: State v. Dunwell, (1853)
3 R.I. 127; Bedel v. Loomis, (1840) 11 N.H. 9.
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there is a dispute between a state and another state or territory,
the courts will follow the lead of the political departments of
their own state. 60 Of course if the dispute were between two
states and the question had been settled by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the exercise of their original jurisdiction
over such cases, the state courts would doubtless have to apply
the rule of the federal supreme court. It has been stated in
some opinions that whether a given locality is within the bound-
aries of a military reservation is a political question. The deci-
sion of the executive in the location of such boundaries has been
held to settle the matter for the courts.61  It has also been sug-
gested in a number of cases that the making of surveys of gov-
ernment lands is a political function with which the courts may
not interfere.6 2  In one case a decree of a trial court was cor-
rected because it established a private survey in fixing the true
boundaries of a parcel of land, the court observing that "The
making and correction of surveys of public lands belongs to the
political department of the government." 63
Not only does the rule noted in the foregoing cases apply
to the assertion of jurisdiction over land, but it also applies to
the sea. Nations sometimes assert a jurisdiction over the sea
extending far beyond the three mile limit which has up to the
present time generally been considered the usual extent of nat-
ional jurisdiction. The United States has been guilty of just
this sort of thing, and the courts have in several cases been
forced to abide by the assertion of such jurisdiction by Con-
gress.64 Captures made outside the ten mile limit for violation
of revenue laws have been sustained because the courts felt bound
by the action of the political department, that department at the
60Harrold v. Arrington, (1885) 64 Tex. 233. In State v. Bowman,
(1909) 89 Ark. 428, 116 S.W. 896, the state legislature had accepted a strip
of land granted to the state by Congress, and the jurisdiction of the state
courts in cases arising in this locality being challenged the court said:
"The grant of the strip in question by Congress, its acceptance by our legis-
lature, and the subsequent exercise of authority by the state makes the
question a political one, and the courts of the state must treat that as con-
clusive of the question of boundary."6 Benson v. United States, (1892) 146 U.S. 325, 36 L. Ed. 991, 13
S.C.R. 60; United States v. Holt, (1909) 168 Fed. 141.62Haydel v. Defresne, (1854) 17 How. (U.S.) 23, 15 L. Ed. 115;
Kirwan v. Murphy, (1903) 189 U.S. 35, 47 L. Ed. 698, 789, 23 S.C.R. 599;
Murphy v. Tanner, (1910) 176 Fed. 537; Cragin v. Powell, (1888) 128
U.S. 691, 698, 32 L. Ed. 566, 9 S.C.R. 203.63United States v. Redondo Development Company, (1918) 254
Fed. 656.
64In re Cooper, (1892) 143 U. S. 472, 36 L. Ed. 232, 12 S.C.R. 453,
wherein the United States asserted jurisdiction over practically the whole of
Behring Sea.
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time being engaged in a controversy with another nation as to
the true extent of such maritime jurisdiction. 5 When the ques-
tion had been settled by arbitration, however, the courts held that
the decision of the arbitrators was binding on the courts of
the United States, the award having been acceded to by the gov-
ernment. 66 If the government had not recognized the validity
of the arbitration award the courts doubtless would have taken
a different course.
The courts will not determine which of two contending nations
is entitled to a territory. If the executive or legislative depart-
ment recognizes one of the contending parties as the rightful
possessor of the territory in dispute, the courts must accord sim-
ilar recognition to that nation. To quote from the leading
case :67
"To what sovereignty any island or country belongs, is a
question which often arises before courts in the exercise of mari-
time jurisdiction; . . . And can there be any doubt, that when
the executive branch of the government, which is charged with
our foreign relations, shall in its correspondence with a foreign
nation assume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island
or country, it is conclusive on the judicial department ?"
A similar position was taken by the court in a case which involved
the question of the location of a banana plantation, the two
nations involved being Costa Rica and Panama.68 A part of
the District of Columbia was retroceded by the national govern-
ment to Virginia, and the court refused to pass upon the validity
of the retrocession of the territory, holding Virginia to be the
sovereign of the territory.60
It seems as though it makes a difference whether it is the
state department or the department of justice which is putting
forward the claim of jurisdiction, for there have been cases in
which the latter department has been contending in a suit before
the court that a given territory was within the jurisdiction of the
United States where the court has refused to accede to that
view. 6  But where the courts are empowered by statute to
settle claims involving territory and boundary they may proceed
65The James G. Swan, (1892) 50 Fed. 108; The Kodaiak, (1892) 53
Fed. 126, both dealing with Alaskan fishing off the coast at a distance of
ten miles or more.66La Ninfa, (1896) 75 Fed. 513.67Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Company, (1839) 13 Pet. U.S. 415,
10 L. Ed. 226.
6SAmerican Banana Company v. United States Fruit Company, (1908)
160 Fed. 184.
69Philips v. Payne, (1875) 92 U. S. 130, 132, 23 L. Ed. 649.7OUnited States v. Rice, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 246, 4 L. Ed. 562.
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to do so 71 and when the United States appears as a suitor in
the courts the ordinary rules which prevail in actions between
private individuals will govern.7 2  Congress can divest a political
question of its character by providing that it be settled by the
courts. In one such case the court admitted documents in evi-
dence, though those documents were not recognized by the execu-
tive department. In Cordova v. Grant73 the government sug-
gested that the court try only cases of squatters, and not cases
involving Mexican land titles, there being a dispute at the time
between the United States and Mexico over the land involved.
The court, acting upon this suggestion from the government, pro-
ceeded to try only squatters' titles. Sometimes it seems as
though the courts verge close upon the decision of questions of
territorial sovereignty, but when closely examined it will be
found generally that other explanations of the cases of this
appearance are available. So when the court construes a statute
or proclamation it must be borne in mind that it is the attitude
of the political department which is being sought through the
medium of interpretation.7 4  A case concerning the status of the
Isle of Pines is to be explained on this ground.75  The court in
that case intimates that the status of the island was to be deter-
mined as a matter of fact, but recourse was had to the acts of
the political departments in this case also. It seems, therefore,
that the courts will follow the political departments in their as-
sertion of jurisdiction over territory whether on land or on sea,
as well as in disputes between foreign nations over a territory,
except in such cases as the political departments may authorize
the court to settle as a matter of law.
7
6
71United States v. Arredondo, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 691, 8 L. Ed. 402.'
In Tartar Chemical Co. v. United States, (1902) 116 Fed. 726, the court
settled the question of the status of Algiers according to the principles of
the French law, the court having jurisdiction under the act giving juris-
diction in cases involving customs appeals.
72United States v. Castillero, (1862) 2 Black (U.S.) 17, 320-321, 17
L. Ed. 360.
73(1919) 248 U.S. 413, 63 L. Ed. 334, 39 S.C.R. 138.
74Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, (1901) 183 U.S. 176, 46
L. Ed. 138, 22 S.C.R. 59.
75Pearcy v. Stranahan, (1907) 205 U.S. 257, 51 L. Ed. 793, 27
S.C.R. 545.
761t is probably not necessary to call attention to the fact that the
Supreme Court of the United States is empowered to settle disputes over
boundaries arising between states. See Rhode Island v. Mass., (1838) 12
Pet. 657, 9 L. Ed. 1233.
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5. RECOGNITION OF STATES, GOVERNMENTS, WAR AND
MEASURES SHORT OF WAR
The recognition of a state is a function entrusted to the
executive department. It was argued in the early case of Rose
v. Himely77 that the court should regard Santo Domingo as
an independent state for the reason that not only had that island
declared its independence but it had succeeded in maintaining
that independence for a considerable period of time. The court
refused to accede to this view, Chief Justice Marshall stating
that the court must consider the island under French dominion
until the government of the United States should recognize the
independence of the revolting colony. A plea which did not aver
that Petion and Christophe were foreign states which "had been
duly recognized as such by the government of the United States"
was held bad in Gelston v. Hoyt.7 1 "A republic of whose exist-
ence we know nothing" was the characterization of the Republic
of Mexico by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Klint-
lock,79 which involved the validity of a commission purported
to be issued by authority of that state. The court was asked in
Kennett v. Chambers"° to say whether Texas was a sovereign
state previous to its annexation to the United States. The de-
partment of government charged with the control of foreign
relations was said in that case to be the proper one to settle the
status of Texas.
In one case Justice Johnson on circuit expressed the opinion
that in the absence of any affirmative recognition of independence
77(1808) 4 Cranch (U.S.) 241, 2 L. Ed. 608. In Clark v. United States,
(1811) 3 Wash. (U.S.C.C.) 101, Fed. Cas. No. 2,838, a question was made
whether an act of Congress of March 1, 1809, forbidding imports to the
United States from England or France or any of the colonies of either,
applied to imports from Santo Domingo. It was contended by counsel for
the government that by the law of nations the court could not pass upon
the question. The court held that Congress did not intend to include imports
from Santo Domingo, but on the contrary, had given evidence of its opinion
that France still retained the sovereignty over the island.
78(1818) 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 246, 4 L. Ed. 381. In United States v.
Hutchings, (1817) 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 543, Fed. Cas. No. 15,429, Chief
Justice Marshall sitting on circuit, said, speaking of the Spanish colony of
Buenos Ayres: "That before it could be considered independent by the
judiciary of foreign nations, it was necessary that its independence should
be recognized by the executive authority of those nations."
79(1820) 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 144, 5 L. Ed. 55.
80(1852) 14 How. (U.S.) 38, 14 L. Ed. 316. The same rule was applied
during the Civil War with regard to the Confederate states. In response
to a question by a juror, Justice Nelson stated in one case that the court
could not pass upon the de facto independence of the Confederate states in
1861. United States v. Baker, (1861) 5 Blatch. (U.S.C.C.) 6, Fed. Cas.
No. 14,501.
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by the government "courts exercising jurisdiction of interna-
tional law may often be called to deduce the fact of national in-
dependence from history, evidence, or public notoriety . . . 81
This decision was, however, negatived by the Supreme Court on
an appeal.8 2
Not only is the recognition of a state a political question but
the recognition of the government of a state also is to be placed
in that class.8 3 When the executive has not recognized the gov-
ernment of a state the courts are not at liberty to treat that
government as having any legal existence so far as they are
concerned.8 4 On the other hand, if the executive has recognized
a government as the government of a given state, the courts are
bound to consider that government as the legal government in
the state. This sometimes leads to curious results. In 1917 two
cases were decided in the Supreme Court in which the court
followed the executive department in their recognition of the
Carranza government in Mexico.85 That government soon fell
from power. The succeeding government was not recognized
by the state department for several years. Nevertheless, in 1923,
shortly before such recognition had been extended, a New York
court held itself powerless to give any force and effect to a decree
of a Mexican court because the government had not been rec-
ognized."6
In connection with the changes in government which took
place in Russia during the World War a number of cases have
been raised in the courts of the United States wherein it was
sought to have the courts determine whether the Soviet Republic
was the legal government of Russia so far as the United States
was concerned. In 1918 it was decided that evidence tending to
show "who and what the present government of Russia is" was
inadmissible, because the state department had recognized the
Kerensky government.8 7 That government was of very short
81Consul of Spain v. The Conception, (1819) 2 Wheeler Cr. Cas. 597,
Fed. Cas. No. 3,137. This portion of the opinion was dictum.82(1821) Wheat. (U.S.) 235, 5 L. Ed. 249.
83The Nereide, (1815) 9 Cranch (U.S.) 388, 3 L. Ed. 769; The
Estrella, (1819) 4 Wheat. 298, 4 L. Ed. 574; The Nueva Anna and Liebre,
(1821) 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 193, 5 L. Ed. 239.84See on this general topic the article by E. D. Dickinson, The Un-
recognized State or Government in English and American Law, 22 Mich.
L. Rev. 29.
ssRicaud v. American Metal Co., (1918) 246 U.S. 304, 62 Ed. 304, 38
S.C.R. 312; Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., (1918) 246 U.S. 297, 62 L. Ed.
727, 38 S. C. R. 300.86See 22 Mich. L. Rev. 29-31.87Agency of Canadian Car & Foundry Co. v. American Can Co., (1918)
253 Fed. 152.
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duration. The Soviet Republic was established and constituted
the de facto government of Russia for a period extending to the
present time. In spite of the patent and notorious fact that the
Soviet Republic is the government of Russia today, and has
been well established for several years the courts have held as
late as the month of October, 1923, that the government of Russia
is in legal contemplation of the courts of the United States that
government which was recognized in 1918.8
The recognition of the diplomatic character of persons claim-
ing to represent the government of a state is also a political
question. This rule applies to diplomats and consuls.89
The recognition of belligerency is likewise a political ques-
tion.90 This is true in cases of domestic uprising as well as in
cases involving foreign nations, for several cases arose during
and after the Civil War which turned on that question, and it
was said in them that the courts must follow the action of the
president in his recognition of the Southern states as belliger-
ents.9  The same doctrine applies also to a state of insurgency. 92
Whether the United States wishes to enforce a policy of
neutrality towards belligerents is not for the courts to determine.
If the executive and legislative departments of the government
permit shipments of arms to be made to a belligerent, it is not for
the courts to halt the shipments. Attempts to procure injunctions
against such shipments have failed.93
85Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., (1923) 293 Fed. 135.
See Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, (1923) 234 N.Y. 372, 138 N.E. 24. Also
the Rogday, (1920) 278 Fed. 294; The Rogday, (1920) 279 Fed. 130.
s9United States v. Liddle, (1808) 2 Wash. (U.S.C.C.) 205, Fed. Cas.
No. 15,598; United States v. Ortega, (1825) 4 Wash. (U.S.C.C.) 531, Fed.
Cas. No. 15,971; also (1826) 11 Wheat. (U.S.) 467, 6 L. Ed. 521; Ex parte
Hitz, (1884) 111 U.S. 766, 28 L. Ed. 592, 4 S.C.R. 698; The Rogday, (1920)
279 Fed. 130; In re Baiz, (1890) 135 U.S. 403, 34 L. Ed. 222, 10 S.C.R. 854;
Savie v. City of New York, (1922) 118 Misc. 156, 193 N.Y.S. 577, (Revoca-
tion of exequatur by the president).90The Josefa Segunda, (1820) 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 338, 5 L. Ed. 104;
United States v. Palmer, (1818) 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 610, 4 L. Ed. 471; The
Divina Pastora, (1819) 4 Wheat. (U.S.) 52, 4 L. Ed. 512; Underhill
v. Hernandez, (1897) 168 U.S. 250, 42 L. Ed. 456, 18 S.C.R. 83; The
Ambrose Light, (1885) 25 Fed. 408. See also United States v. Trumbull,
(1891) 48 Fed. 94; The Itata, (1893) 56 Fed. 505; The Hornet, (1870)
2 Abb. N. S. 35, Fed. Cas. No. 6,705.91The Brig Amy Warwick, (1862) 2 Black (U.S.) 635, 17 L. Ed. 459;
United States v. Greathouse, (1863) 4 Sawy. (U.S.C.C.) 457, Fed. Cas.
No. 15,254; The Josiah Harthorn, (1862) Fed. Cas. No. 3,491a. *For the
rights of Southerners in northern courts, see United States v. One Hundred
Bags of Cement, (1862) Fed. Cas. No. 15,945.
"
2United States v. The Three Friends, (1897) 166 U. S. 1, 41 L. Ed.
897, 17 S.C.R. 495.93See Pearson v. Parsons, (1901) 47 C.C.A. 185, 108 Fed. 46, for an
attempt to halt arms shipments to South Africa during the Boer War.
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6. STATUS OF INDIAN TRIBES
The Indian has occupied an anomalous position in the con-
stitutional system of the United States. 4  The tribal Indian
is not a foreigner, nor is he a domestic citizen. He is a member of
a dependent domestic nation. Whatever may be the difficulty in
explaining the position of the Indian in this country, it is now well
settled that the national government has practically complete
control over his destinies so long as he is in the tribal state. 5
The tribal state is not to be determined by the court from an
examination of the evidence as to the stage of civilization in
which a given group may be living. It is the political depart-
ments who determine whether a group of Indians constitute a
tribe, and the court applies their findings as a rule of decision
without entering into the merits of the case.
The control over tribal Indians has been derived from a
number of sources. Congress is given power to regulate com-
merce with the Indians." But this power is limited by the fact
that the constitutional grant extends only to Indians in the tribal
relation. Nevertheless, this grant of power has been construed
in a very broad manner9 The treaty making power -was used
in several hundred instances prior to 1871 by the national gov-
ernment in its dealings with the Indian tribes.9 s These treaties
were negotiated by the president and ratified by the Senate, and
to all intents and purposes were on a par with those treaties
concluded with foreign nations.9 9 A third source of power is
Also a Wisconsin circuit court case reprinted in 11 Am. J. Int. L. 883,
similar attempt as to shipments to Allies during World War.
94See in general for treatment of the Indians in our system of gov-
ernment, Willoughby, op. cit., chap. 20; Story, Commentaries, secs. 1097-
1111; Watson, Constitution of the United States, pp. 516-19; Hall, Consti-
tutional Law 313; Burdick, op. cit., pp. 312-17; Thayer, Legal Essays,(A People Without Law) pp. 91-141; Canfield, The Legal Position of the
Indians, 15 Am. L. Rev. 21, 22 Cyc. 109 ff.95United States v. Kagama, (1886) 118 U.S. 375, 30 L. Ed. 228, 6
S.C.R. 1109.96United States Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3.
97Prentice and Egan, The Commerce Clause of the Federal Consti-
tution, 342.9SThayer, op. cit., 109. This method of dealing with the Indians was
discontinued in 1871 when a rider was appended to an appropriation bill
taking this power from the hands of the president and placing it under the
control of congress. This was a doubtful constitutionality. See Hall, op.
cit., 324. Indian treaties are construed less strictly than treaties with foreign
nations, the situation of the Indian as a ward being taken into consideration.
Thus, technical terms are often given a more general meaning. See 2 But-
ler, The Treaty Making Power, 203-215; Jones v. Meehan, (1899) 175 U.S.
1, 44 L. Ed. 49, 20 S.C.R. 1.
9922 Cyc. 121. The qualification of interpretation set forth in the pre-
ceding note should be mentioned in this connection.
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that which is found in the control which Congress possesses over
territories. °00 That was important at one time, but is of little
significance at the present time so far as Indians in the conti-
nental portion of the United States are concerned. It has been
said by the Supreme Court that it is the duty of the national
government to aid and protect the Indians, and that because of
this duty to them Congress must have the power to legislate con-
cerning Indian affairs.1 0' While this may be a rather irregular
doctrine when viewed from. the standpoint of constitutional law,
the language which has been used by the court at times would
seem to warrant the belief that legislation relating to Indians
would be upheld on this ground if other sources failed.
In the famous case of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia0 2 all the
justices agreed that the status of an Indian tribe was a matter
for the political department to determine. The divergence of
opinion in that case came in attempting to determine whether
the national government had recognized the Indians as a nation.
It resolved itself into a matter of interpretation. The majority
of the court thought that the government had recognized the
Cherokee Nation as a domestic nation, not as a foreign nation,
at least not a foreign nation within the meaning of the judiciary
article. The dissenting justices were of the opinion that the
tribes had been recognized as a foreign nation capable of main-
taining suit in the Supreme Court.
In United States v. Holliday-°" the question was made
whether a certain group of Indians constituted a tribe, and the
court decided that it would follow the executive and legislative
branches in their recognition of the group in question as a tribe.
The commissioner of Indian affairs had recognized the Indians
as a tribe in this case, and the court followed that action. An
attempt by the state of Kansas to tax certain lands belonging to
the Shawnee Indians was resisted on the ground that the Indians
in question constituted a tribe under the control of the national
government. Justice Davis of the Supreme Court said,104
10oUnited States constitution, art. 4, sec. 3, p. 2. Canfield is the only
writer examined who has called attention to this source of power. See 15
Am. L. Rev. 24. The note in 21 L.R.A. 173 stating that most of the cases
have come up under the power of Congress to govern territories is in error.
'
0 United States v. Kagama, (1886) 118 U.S. 375, 30 L. Ed. 228, 6
S.C.R. 1109.
302(1831) 5 Pet. (U.S.) 1, 8 L. Ed. 25. The historical background of
this case is set forth in Beveridge, John Marshall, p. 539 if; 5 McMaster,
History of the United States, p. 175 if; 2 Warren, The Supreme Court in
United States History, chap. 19.103(1865) 3 Wall. (U.S.) 407, 18 L. Ed. 182.
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"If the tribal organization of the Shawnee is preserved in-
tact, and recognized by the political department of the govern-
ment as existing, then they are a 'people distinct from others,'
capable of making treaties, separated from the jurisdiction of
Kansas, and to be governed exclusively by the government of
the Union."
The action of the political department was held to settle "beyond
controversy that the Sha-wnees are as yet a distinct people, with
a perfect tribal organization."
The regulation of the liquor traffic with the Indians has
given rise to considerable litigation. The traffic to be regulated
was generally with reservation Indians. It is well settled that
Congress may regulate this commerce."0 5 It was observed in one
case which involved a certain Wascoe Indian.. 6 that the power
to sever relations with a tribe did not reside in the individual
Indian. The court ruled that "The recognition or dissolution of
the tribal relation is a matter in which the courts usually follow
the action of the political departments of the government."
The courts have refused to decide for themselves whether a




Guidance will be sought in such cases in acts -f Congress par-
ticularly, and sometimes in treaties concluded with the Indians.
The court has looked to congressional acts and treaties to ascer-
tain whether a half-breed belongs to the side of the white father
or the Indian mother. 08 The fact that the lands of the tribe
have been allotted in severalty does not relieve the courts of the
duty to abide by the decision of the political departments in
these cases. It was stated in one case where this was true, that :109
"Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians
has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the
power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be
controlled by the judicial department of the government."
'
04The Kansas Indians, (1866) 5 Wall. (U.S.) 737, 18 L. Ed. 667;
also the N.Y. Indians v. United States, (1898) 170 U.S. 1, 32, 42 L. Ed.
927, 18 S.C.R. 531.
0
-
5United States v. Earl, (1883) 17 Fed. 75. See also United States
v. Boyd, (1895) 68 Fed. 577, where it was said: "In determining the atti-
tude of the government towards the Indians,-all Indians,--the courts follow
the action of the executive and other political departments of the govern-
ment, whose more especial duty it is to determine such affairs." See also
Holden v. Joy, (1872) 17 Wall. (U.S.) 211, 21 L. Ed. 523.
107Me-Shing-go-me-sia v. State, (1871) 36 Ind. 310, 316.
08Davis v. Sitka School Board, (1908) 3 Alaska 481, 486; United States
v. Higgins, (1900) 103 Fed. 348.
'
0 OLone Wolf v. Hitchcock, (1903) 187 U.S. 553, 47 L. Ed. 299, 23
S.C.R. 216; Williams v. Johnson, (1915) 239 U.S. 414, 60 L. Ed. 358,
36 S.C.R. 150.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The doctrine of the above cases has been followed by the courts
with the possible exception of one case" 0 wherein the status
of Indian tribes has been involved.
Justice Van Devanter suggested a limitation on the scope of
this rule, however, when he said in United States v. Sandoval:11-1
"Of course, it is not meant by this that Congress may bring
a community or body of people within the range of this power
by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe."
This dictum calls attention to the limits of the power which may
be exercised under the authority of the control over Indians
which is given to congress.
7. GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
The states of the United States are guaranteed a republican
form of government by the fourth article, of the federal con-
stitution, section four of which reads:"2
"The United States shall guarantee to every state in this
Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each
of them against invasion; and on the application of the legisla-
ture, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be con-
vened) against domestic violence."
It will be noted that there are three guaranties contained in this
section, namely of protection against invasion, domestic violence,
and of a republican form of government. Congress has provided
by statute for the enforcement of the first two guaranties, 113
but has not seen fit to include the third guaranty in the statute.
In Luther v. Borden," 4 a case involving the enforcement
of the guaranty of protection in case of domestic violence, which
enforcement had been entrusted to the president by statute, the
court, speaking through Chief Justice Taney laid down the rule
"'0See Forty-three Gallons of Cognac Brandy, (1882) 11 Fed. 47, and
(1882) 14 Fed. 539.
"'United States v. Sandoval, (1913) 231 U.S. 28, 58 L. Ed. 107, 34
S.C.R. 1.
112For summary of debates in the constitutional convention on this sec-
tion see 2 Watson, op. cit., p. 1282 ff. See also Madison's Notes, under
dates of June 5, 11, and July 18. See letters reprinted in the Scott edition
of the Federalist, on pages 502, 546. Also McClain, Constitutional Law,
213-17; Black, op. cit., 309-313; Watson, op. cit., 1282-92; Tucker, Consti-
tution of the United States, secs. 310-11 ; Story, Commentaries, sec. 1813-21 ;
Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 151-66; Rawle, A View of the Constitution of
the United States, 288-91; Miller, Lectures on the Constitution 640-42.
iAn Act to Provide for Calling Forth the Militia to Execute the Laws
of the Union. Annals, of 3rd Congress, 1793-95, p. 1508. On congressional
power in this regard, see 2 Tucker, op. cit., p. 637.
14(1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 12 L. Ed. 581. In connection with this
case see McMaster, History of the People of the United States, pp. 163-78
and authorities there cited; 2 Warren, op. cit., 459; Willoughby, op. cit.,
156-61.
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that the enforcement of the guaranty of republican government
was retained by Congress, and that the question of its enforce-
ment was a political matter over which the courts would not take
jurisdiction. The decision in Luther v. Borden did not rest upon
this ground, but rather upon the ground that the president had
been selected by Congress to carry out the guaranty of pro-
tection in case of domestic violence. Because the dictum of Chief
Justice Taney has exerted such an important influence in all
subsequent cases arising under this clause of the constitution,
his statement will be quoted in full. He said :11
"Under this article of the constitution it rests with Congress
to decide what government is the established one in a state. For
as the United States guarantee to each state a republican govern-
ment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is estab-
lished in the state before it can determine whether it is republi-
can or not. And when the senators and representatives of a
state are admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority
of the government under which they are appointed, as well as
its republican character, is recognized by the proper constitu-
tional authority. And its decision is binding on every other
department of the government, and could not be questioned in a
judicial tribunal. It is true that the contest in this case did not
last long enough to bring the matter to this issue; and as no
senators or representatives were elected under the authority of
the government of which Mr. Dorr was the head, Congress was
not called upon to decide the controversy. Yet the right to de-
cide was placed there, and not in the courts."
It will be seen from the last two sentences of the quotation from
the opinion of the chief justice that the opinion on this point
was dictum, but few would be willing to disagree with the sound-
ness of the view expressed by him in the quotation set out. For
it is reasonable to believe that Congress wished to retain the
power to pass upon the republican character of state govern-
ments, it having given the enforcement of the other two guar-
anties to the executive, but saying nothing as to the guaranty
of republican government.
Texas v. White"1 6 was the next important case involving
this provision of the constitution. During the reconstruction
period it was sought to justify the policy of the radicals in
115(1849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 43, 12 L. Ed. 581. See Martin v. Mott,(1827) 12 Wheat. (U.S.) 19, 6 L. Ed. 537 on other portions of the statute
of 1795.
116(1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 700, 727, 19 L. Ed. 227. See 3 Warren, op.
cit., 210; Pierson, Texas v. White, in 18 and 19 S.W. Hist. Quart., a long
article printed in several issues, covering the historical background of the
case in detail.
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Congress by deriving from this clause of the constitution power
to set up governments in the Southern states. The only trouble
with this was that the governments set up could by no stretch of
the imagination be called republican. They were military govern-
ments and so designated by the very acts which established
them.1 17  During the course of the reconstruction period Texas
came before the Supreme Court and asked to be admitted to the
court for purposes of suit. The'court decided that Texas was a
state of the Union, and also decided that she could sue in the
Supreme Court. Texas did not have a republican government
at this time, and Congress had expressly stated several times that
Texas did not have such a government."" That body refused to
recognize the government of Texas until 1870, when judged by
the rule enunciated by Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden.
The upshot of the decision in Texas v. White is merely this, that
a state does not need to have a republican government in order
to maintain suit in the Supreme Court. Any other view of the
case fails to dispose of the conflict between the avowed intention
of the court to follow the lead of Congress in the matter, and
the fact that the court would have to disregard that body's
attitude if Texas were admitted to maintain suit.
In Luther v. Borden and Texas v. White forcible attempts
at changing state governments were under consideration. In
more recent times less vigorous methods of altering the character
of state governments have been challenged as violating the form
of government guaranteed to the states. Reference here is had
to the initiative and referendum features embodied in numerous
state constitutions. These provisions were attacked on this
ground, but the court held that whether such provisions in a
state constitution, and laws enacted under such constitutional
provisions rendered the government of a state unrepublican in
form, was a question for Congress to decide.1 9 Thus it is hardly
117See the Three Reconstruction Acts, passed March 2, 23, and July 19,
1867, 14 Stat. at L. 428; 15 Stat. at L. 2, 14.
11"In support of the view that Congress did not admit that the gov-
ernment of Texas was republican the following is submitted. None of the
state governments formed under Lincoln's proclamation of Dec. 8, 1863,
were admitted by Congress. See Bassett, Short History of the United
States, 597. The Twenty Second Joint Rule and the resolution that the
electoral votes of the states restored under Lincoln be not counted, are
mentioned in Bassett, p. 598. See further, the act of July 19, the act of
March 2, and the resolution of July 20, 1868, excluding the electoral votes
of Texas. For these see McDonald, Documentary Source Book, pp. 514,
500, 535. The first compliance with the rule laid down in Luther v. Borden
was in 1870 %vhen the representatives from Texas were admitted to Con-
gress. Bassett, op. cit., 625.
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correct to say that the court upheld the initiative and referendum
provisions on this score, but rather that they refused to pass
upon their merits.
It has been held that whether Congress coerced a state into
accepting its constitution was a political question.120  But there
were expressed in some of the opinions sustaining this view some
qualifications, and in Coyle V. Sinith,12' the court held that the
imposition of conditions upon a state as the price of admission
to the union which substantially affected that political equal-
ity of all the states which is implied in the federal system of gov-
ernment, could not be sustained under the guise of guaranteeing
a republican form of government to that state. There are limit-
ations on the scope of the things which can be accomplished
under the guaranty clause.
Whether a state constitution or amendments to the same have
been adopted in a proper manner will not be settled by the federal
courts.1 22  The authorizing of a railroad to be built outside and
beyond the county line, to be paid for in part by the freeholders
of the county,12  the levy of school taxes without popular
vote, 2 4 and. the changing of municipal boundaries 125 have been
held to be political questions. The federal courts have also re-
fused to hold that irregularity in election proceedings and regis-
tration of voters in the states have rendered the states in question
unrepublican as to the form of their government.1 26  In a com-
paratively recent case the.court refused to decide which of the
two claimants to the governorship of Kentucky was to be deemed
19Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, (1911) 223 U.S. 118, 56
L. Ed. 377, 32 S.C.R. 224; Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrandt, (1915) 241
U.S. 565, 60 L. Ed. 1172, 36 S.C.R. 708.
12oWhite v. Hart, (1871) 13 Wall. 646, 649, 20 L. Ed. 685, as to the
constitution of Georgia adopted by that state during the reconstruction
period. See also Marsh v. Burroughs, (1871) 1 Woods (U.S.C.C.) 463, Fed.
Gas. No. 9,112. That such acceptance by the state at congressional dicta-
tion did not make the constitution an act of Congress see Hatch v. Bur-
roughs, (1870) 1 Woods (U.S.C.C.) 439, Fed. Cas. No. 6,203, and also
Calhoun v. Calhoun, (1870) 2 S.C. 283.
-1(1910) 221 U.S. 559, 55 L. Ed. 853, 31 S.C.R. 688.
122Marshall v. Dye, (1913) 231 U.S. 250, 58 L. Ed. 206, 34 S.C.R. 92;
Smith v. Good, (1888) 34 Fed. 204; Brickhouse v. Brooks, (1908) 165
Fed. 534.
l2 McCoy v. Washington County, (1862) 3 Wall. Jr. (U.S.C.C.) 381,
Fed. Cas. No. 8,731.
'
24Susman v. Bd. of Education of Pittsburgh, (1915) 228 Fed. 217.
"-'Forsyth v. Hammond, (1897) 166 U.S. 506, 519, 41 L. Ed. 1095,
17 S.C.R. 665; Atty. Genl. of Mich. v. Lowrey, (1905) 199 U.S. 233, 50
L. Ed. 167, 26 S.C.R. 27. See also O'Neill v. Leamer, (1915) 239 U.S. 244,
60 L. Ed. 249, 36 S.C.R. 54.
"26 Anthony v. Burrow, (1904) 129 Fed. 783; Green v. Mills, (1895)
69 Fed. 852.:
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the rightful contender. 127  In a criminal case' 28 it was asserted
by counsel that an irregularity in the adoption of the criminal
code of the state of Texas rendered the government of that state
funrepublican, but the court refused to pass upon the question.
The courts have, however, in occasional dicta enumerated var-
ious characteristics and factors by which to judge a republican
government. For example, it was said in United States v.
Critikshank.29 that the equality of citizens was a characteristic
of that republican government which flourishes in this country.
The judicial department has been mentioned as an essential ele-
ment in a republican government, 130 while on the other hand it is
apparently not necessary that -women should be enfranchised
in a republican government. 3' It was queried in South Carolina
v. United States"32 whether the fact that a state entered into
the public utility business would render the government of the
state unrepublican, a suggestion severely criticized by one com-
mentator. 3 3  These suggestions are interesting, but that is the
extent of their importance.
It is clear that the enforcement of the guaranty of republican
government is a political question which the courts will not at-
tempt to settle. If Congress recognizes a state government as
being of that character the courts will also regard it in the same
light. 34  It appears, however, that there are limitations upon the
exercise of the power conferred in this clause upon Congress,
for according to several dicta and Coyle v. Smith, Congress may
not impose unconstitutional restrictions upon the states under the
guise of maintaining a republican form of government.
CONCLUSIONS
These then are general subjects which the courts have held
to be political in their nature. There doubtless are others which
have been overlooked in the search made for cases on this topic
by the -writer. A study of the cases brings out the fact that there
are several views regarding the exact character of a political
127Taylor v. Beckham, (1900) 178 U.S. 548, 44 L. Ed. 1187, 20
S.C.R. 890, 1009.
128In re Duncan, (1891) 139 U.S. 449, 35 L. Ed. 219, 11 S.C.R. 573.
129(1875) 92 U.S. 542, 555, 23 L. Ed. 588.
130 Collector v. Day, (1870) 11 Wall. U.S. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122.
"31Minor v. Happersett, (1874) 21 Wall. (U.S.) 162, 175, 22 L.
Ed. 627.
"3-South Carolina v. United States, (1905) 199 U.S. 437, 454, 50 L. Ed.
261, 25 S.C.R. 110.
"3Willoughby, op. cit., 153.
134Griffin Case, (1869) Fed. Cas. No. 5,815.
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question. But by far the greater number of cases treat a political
question as one which is committed to either the legislature or
the executive for final determination. It seems to result from the
separation of powers between the three departments of govern-
ment. Another view of political questions which occasionally
finds expression in the cases is that they are beyond the control
of the courts because their settlement rests with the electorate.
This view regards these questions as political because they are
involved in politics in the general meaning of that term. In-
stances of this view are to be found in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Woodbury in Luther v. Borden,3 5 and the opinion of
Chief Justice Fuller in Taylor v. Beckhan.1"6
It is difficult to state with satisfactory clarity the distinctive
functions of the three departments of government as they oper-
ate in the national government of the United States. The legis-
lature is often designated as the rule making body, the executive
as the rule enforcing body, and the courts as the rule applying
body. The legislature is said to prescribe the laws which the
courts are to apply. The judicial department is characterized by
deliberative consideration of controverted facts with the purpose
of applying the law to them which has been prescribed by the
legislative department. Whatever may be the difficulties in defin-
itively describing the differences between the judicial and the legis-
lative department it seems settled and clear that the court must
have some rule to follow before it can operate. Where no rules
exist the court is powerless to act. From this it follows that the
courts cannot enter into questions of statecraft or policy. Es-
pecially is this true when the decisions which they might make
would perhaps not be heeded by the other departments of the
government because of the strong political considerations in-
volved. The conduct of foreign relations is of necessity char-
acterized by considerations of policy rather than by a regard for
the application of minute rules of law. The judiciary of nations
have not as yet reached the point where they apply the rules of
international law as limitations upon the departments of govern-
ment which control the international relations of their nation.
Until that time comes, most of the questions arising out of foreign
affairs cannot be settled in the domestic courts.
While this is especially clear with regard to the conduct of
foreign relations, it is almost equally applicable to the other sub-
jects which have been held to be political questions. There are
1:1(5849) 7 How. (U.S.) 1, 51 ff., 12 L. Ed. 581.
136(1900) 178 U.S. 548, 44 L. Ed. 1187, 20 S.C.R. 890, 1009.
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not any rules of law nor principles of law readily applicable to
the conduct of Indian affairs. The nature of the question is such
that the law making department has not seen fit to commit it
to the cut and dried methods of the courts. Questions of policy
are too paramount to admit of the application of definite legal
principles, and no legal principles have been developed which are
applicable.
It is true that the courts have not formulated any very clear
conception of the doctrine of political questions, nor have they
always acted upon the same general principles. But a reading
of the cases seems to warrant the statement that the most im-
portant factor in the formulation of the doctrine is that stated
above, namely, a lack of legal principles to apply to the questions
presented. There can be no doubt but that the court has occa-
sionally dodged the responsibility attendant upon the decision of
some cases by calling them political. These cases are few in
number, and any view which attempts to dispose of the subject
of political questions in that manner is superficial. 137 A more
important factor in the cases than this last mentioned factor
has been a desire on the part of the courts not to apply too strictly
the doctrine of constitutional limitations to the exercise of certain
powers which have seemed necessary to the effective conduct of
the business of government, but which has not been granted to
the national government by the constitution. This factor is evi-
dent in the cases on foreign relations, as well as those concerning
the Indians. If one reasons from the federal character of the
United States he is likely to be impressed at first thought with
the apparent lack of harmony between the doctrine of constitu-
tional construction -which views the national government as one
of delegated powers, and the exercise of a large number of
powers by the national government in matters of international
concern, which are not expressly nor even in many cases im-
pliedly granted to that government. The difficulty disappears to a
large extent when it is remembered that the federal character
of the government is restricted to municipal affairs, and that'
for purposes of international relations the government of the
137This will appear when one considers that the court decides many
cases which are fraught with just such possibilities and consequences as
would tempt the court to dodge the case. No better example could be
found than the recent decision of the child labor case, Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., (1922) 259 U.S. 20, 42 S.C.R. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817. Many
other cases along this line could be cited. Any number of the cases
which are actually decided are more "dangerous" than those which are
alleged to be sidestepped.
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United States is unitary. The national government may exercise
the powers of sovereignty at international law. There would,
therefore, be no need under this view to resort to the doctrine of
political questions in order to allow the exercise of these powers
by the national government.
. Constitutional limitations are not thrown overboard by the
theory of political questions. To argue that this theory should
be extended so as to enable the national legislature to embark
upon any program of social legislation vhich it should deem
proper is totally to misunderstand the underlying principles of
the cases. 13 s A study of the cases will show that those questions
which are called political that do not relate to foreign relations
are repeatedly treated by the courts as subject to constitutional lim-
itations. This is clear in the cases concerning Indian affairs and
the guaranty clause of the constitution. For these reasons it is
believed that the true basis of a political question is the lack
of legal principles for the courts to apply in their consideration
of cases involving certain types of subject matter, and the com-
mitment of their final disposition to the political branches of the
government. Perhaps the explanation of the doctrine of politi-
cal questions is to be sought as much in history as in logic, but
there is also some basis for it in logic.
'
38For an example of this type of argument see the article by Maurice
Finkelstein, Judicial Self-Limitation, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 338.
